Israeli Chiefs See Long-Term Regional Security Role

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As Israel approaches the third anniversary of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, its defense establishment is converging around a strategy built on long-term military positions, continued operations against hostile forces and limited withdrawals rather than a broad return to prewar borders.

Interviews with current and former senior Israeli defense officials indicate broad agreement that Israel should maintain security zones in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria for years, even as the United States presses Jerusalem to withdraw and diplomatic arrangements take shape.

The officials remain divided, however, over how far Israel should accommodate Washington, how Gaza should be governed and what concessions should accompany Israeli withdrawals.

A majority of senior defense officials favour giving the Palestinian Authority a larger role in Gaza and believe the process should move faster than Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has allowed.

Some officials view Netanyahu as an obstacle to a transition from Hamas, while a minority supports his insistence on the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, or NCAG, as a mechanism to pressure Palestinian officials to operate under the US-backed Board of Peace framework.

The preference for a larger PA or NCAG role does not mean Israeli officials expect Hamas to disappear quickly as Gaza’s dominant military force. Instead, they argue that an alternative political authority should gain influence even if Hamas disarmament remains incomplete.

The bigger disagreement concerns the size of any Israeli security zone.

Some officials favour retaining the maximum possible territory. Most believe the precise percentage matters less than control of strategically important terrain from which Israel can monitor and prevent attacks.

In Shejaia, that could require Israeli forces to remain relatively deep inside Gaza. Around Rafah, officials believe a smaller Israeli footprint could still provide a strong defensive position.

In northern Gaza, elevated terrain stretching from the Netiv Haasara area towards Beit Hanoun is considered particularly important.

The emerging position is that Israel could accept partial withdrawals in return for partial Hamas concessions, provided strategically valuable high ground remains under Israeli control.

Officials nevertheless expect some form of Gaza security zone to remain for years because they do not believe partial Hamas disarmament or a new political administration will quickly eliminate hostility towards Israel.

Israeli defense officials are similarly divided over the future of the military presence in Lebanon.

Most do not believe the IDF must permanently retain all of the territory it currently controls. But that position is not based on confidence that the Lebanese army can defeat Hezbollah.

Israeli officials have expressed frustration with the Lebanese military’s performance under a pilot security arrangement launched in July. The initiative transferred responsibility in several southern Lebanese villages to the Lebanese army, but Israeli officials say the force has not gone far enough in confronting Hezbollah infrastructure.

The test, according to Israeli officials, will be whether the Lebanese army is prepared to enter Hezbollah positions and dismantle the group’s military infrastructure rather than simply uncover weapons caches.

There is also disagreement over whether Lebanon’s new diplomatic engagement with Israel can produce a meaningful strategic change.

Some officials see an opportunity to reduce the Hezbollah threat through cooperation with Beirut. Others remain sceptical of the Lebanese government’s ability to impose its authority on the organization.

Another point of broad agreement is the continuation of Israel’s so-called “war between wars”, a strategy of periodic military action designed to prevent adversaries from accumulating capabilities that could eventually threaten Israel.

The debate is over how aggressively to pursue it.

Some officials fear that suspending military operations could make them harder to restart when a new threat emerges. Others worry that continued attacks could undermine American support at a time when Israel faces intense international pressure.

The strategic dilemma is therefore increasingly clear: Israel wants freedom to act militarily, but must also weigh the consequences for its relationship with Washington.

Israeli defense officials are particularly reluctant to withdraw substantially from Syria.

Though Syria has not attacked Israel since Ahmad al-Sharaa came to power in December 2024, Israeli officials remain deeply suspicious of his leadership and believe his reluctance to confront Israel could reflect temporary strategic constraints rather than a permanent change in policy.

They are also concerned about the possibility of Syria rebuilding a conventional military capable of fielding heavy weapons, including tanks and fighter aircraft.

Reports that Turkey could help Syria rebuild military capabilities destroyed after the fall of Bashar Assad’s government have heightened those concerns.

For Israeli defense planners, Syria is therefore viewed less as an immediate battlefield than as a potential future strategic threat.

The most serious reassessment concerns Iran. A majority of Israeli defense officials now believe Israel’s strategic position was stronger after its June 2025 operation against Iran than after the early 2026 campaign.

Israeli officials initially emphasized the damage inflicted on Iran’s missile, drone and military capabilities. But they now worry that Tehran has regained room to maneuver after months of recovery.

They are particularly concerned that the Strait of Hormuz crisis has strengthened Iran’s leverage over Washington and that the United States could eventually restrain Israel from launching another major attack if Jerusalem concludes one is necessary.

Officials also believe Iran succeeded in restoring links between its military infrastructure and Hezbollah after Israel had disrupted those connections during the 2025 operation.

Israeli officials are also split over the prospect of another nuclear agreement with Tehran.

One camp insists that Iran must surrender uranium enrichment for an extended period. Others believe President Donald Trump is unlikely to demand that outcome and argue Israel should instead push for the least damaging agreement possible.

One potential compromise would allow Iran to retain a substantial number of centrifuges while maintaining almost no enriched uranium. Another would permit limited low-enriched uranium while reducing the number of centrifuges to near zero.

The central principle would be preventing Iran from simultaneously possessing large enrichment capacity and significant quantities of enriched uranium.

Israeli officials would also seek far more intrusive inspections than those established under the 2015 nuclear agreement, including anytime, anywhere inspections and restrictions on nuclear-metallurgy activities connected to weapons development.

Such an agreement would not eliminate Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but supporters argue it could delay the threat more effectively than the existing situation.

Beyond the nuclear issue, Israeli defense officials remain concerned about Iran’s ability to rebuild its ballistic-missile arsenal.

They see few clear mechanisms for preventing Tehran from producing large numbers of new missiles, particularly because they believe the issue is not a major priority for Washington.

For now, Israeli officials argue that the 2025 and 2026 operations bought Israel valuable time. But the broader assessment is unmistakable: Israel’s defense establishment is preparing for a prolonged period in which military pressure, strategic depth and selective withdrawals will coexist with diplomatic negotiations.

Rather than choosing between permanent occupation and complete withdrawal, Israeli planners appear to be moving towards a narrower model: retaining control of strategically decisive terrain, preserving the ability to strike across the region and relying on political arrangements to gradually weaken the military influence of Hamas and Hezbollah.

The result is a defense strategy defined less by fixed territorial ambitions than by one overriding calculation: Israel wants fewer troops on the ground, but it does not want to surrender the positions it believes are essential to preventing the next war.

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