China must understand one fundamental truth: military superiority does not confer the right to dictate another people’s future. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te is right to insist that the island will strengthen its defences without surrendering its commitment to peace. When a powerful neighbour refuses to rule out force, calls for restraint cannot become demands that the threatened party disarm, retreat or quietly accept domination.
Taiwan faces a brutal strategic reality. Beijing claims the island as Chinese territory and insists that eventual unification is necessary, while Taiwan’s democratically elected government rejects Chinese authority over its affairs. This is not merely a territorial disagreement. It is a confrontation over political freedom, the legitimacy of coercion and the right of a population to determine how it is governed.
Lai’s message deserves unambiguous support: Taiwan must not be expected to purchase peace by sacrificing its freedom. Such a bargain would reward intimidation and invite further pressure. If military threats can force a democratic society to abandon its choices, the lesson would be devastating: sovereignty belongs not to a people, but to whoever possesses the larger arsenal.
That is precisely why credible deterrence matters. Taiwan does not need military strength for its own sake. It needs sufficient defensive capability to convince Beijing that an invasion or other attempt at forcible submission would carry unacceptable costs. Deterrence is not warmongering. Under these circumstances, it is a necessary defence against the prospect of war.
But Taiwan must remain disciplined. Its purpose should be to prevent aggression, not provoke a confrontation it cannot control. Strength and restraint must operate together. The objective is not to defeat China through military might, but to deny China the illusion that force can deliver Taiwan.
No Country Has the Right to Impose Unification
Beijing’s territorial claims do not give it a blank cheque to determine Taiwan’s political future. Historical connections matter, but history cannot permanently override the political choices of people living in the present. Nor does a country’s superior military power transform its preferred territorial outcome into a legitimate one.
The Republic of China government retreated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war in 1949. Taiwan’s National Day commemorates the 1911 uprising that helped bring down China’s last imperial dynasty. These historical circumstances help explain the competing narratives surrounding the island. They do not justify imposing a political settlement through threats or violence.
The essential question is simple: can a population’s future be decided without its meaningful consent? If the answer is no, Beijing must recognize that unification cannot legitimately be pursued through military intimidation. A political outcome achieved by force would not demonstrate the superiority of persuasion. It would demonstrate its failure.
The implications extend far beyond Taiwan. If a powerful state can use military pressure to subordinate a smaller neighbour, international law and national sovereignty become vulnerable to the preferences of the strongest. Smaller countries would have to calculate whether their independence could survive the displeasure of a more powerful state. That is not a stable international order. It is a hierarchy maintained by fear.
The world must therefore reject the dangerous assumption that Taiwan’s size makes its freedom negotiable. Its people are not pieces on a geopolitical chessboard, available for exchange between Beijing and Washington. Their security and political future cannot responsibly be discussed as though their own wishes were incidental.
This principle does not require denying the complexity of the cross-strait dispute. It requires drawing a firm boundary: historical grievances and territorial claims must not become excuses for war. No claim to sovereignty should be treated as permission to threaten an entire population into submission.
American Promises Must Mean Something
The United States bears considerable responsibility for helping preserve stability across the Taiwan Strait. As Taiwan’s most important international supporter, Washington has a substantial role in strengthening the island’s ability to resist coercion. But expressions of concern are not enough. Support that arrives too late to affect an aggressor’s calculations may offer little protection when a crisis begins.
The proposed second American arms package, valued at $14 billion, has yet to receive approval from President Donald Trump, according to the report. That delay raises an important question about timing and credibility. If Taiwan is expected to deter a much larger military, it must have the means to prepare before a confrontation, not simply assurances that assistance might follow.
Weapons alone, however, cannot guarantee security. Taiwan needs a coherent defensive strategy, resilient institutions, civil preparedness and the capacity to withstand pressure. American assistance should reinforce those capabilities rather than encourage the illusion that Washington can solve every security problem on the island’s behalf.
Nor should Taiwan’s fate become a bargaining chip in relations between Washington and Beijing. Dialogue between the two powers is necessary and welcome when it reduces the danger of conflict. But an agreement that improves their relationship by disregarding Taiwan’s security would be a dangerous betrayal of regional stability.
Other Indo-Pacific democracies must also recognize that passivity carries risks. They need not adopt identical positions on every aspect of Taiwan’s status to oppose coercion, strengthen crisis communication and support peaceful dispute resolution. Collective resolve can raise the costs of aggression without making confrontation inevitable.
Washington, Beijing and regional governments must understand that strategic ambiguity, diplomatic engagement and military preparedness serve little purpose if they are not accompanied by serious efforts to prevent miscalculation. Peace requires credible deterrence, but it also requires clear channels through which disputes can be managed before they explode.
The World Must Draw the Line Before War
China’s expanding military capabilities and exercises around Taiwan underscore the danger facing the island. The imbalance between the two militaries is considerable, making defensive modernization an urgent necessity. Yet the greatest danger is not simply that one side possesses more weapons. It is that either side might conclude that military pressure can achieve political objectives without triggering consequences it cannot control.
A conflict would threaten lives, destabilise the Indo-Pacific and place enormous strain on international relations and commerce. Its consequences could extend far beyond the immediate combatants. The cost of miscalculation would be borne not only by governments but by ordinary people who have little influence over the decisions that bring wars about.
Beijing must abandon the assumption that intimidation will eventually produce submission. Pressure can deepen distrust, strengthen resistance and make peaceful accommodation more difficult. If China genuinely wants stability, it must demonstrate that commitment through restraint and a willingness to manage differences without threats of force.
Taiwan, meanwhile, must remain resolute without becoming reckless. Its leaders should strengthen defence, protect democratic institutions and preserve opportunities for dialogue. Washington must make its support credible, while regional powers must show that the preservation of peace is a shared responsibility, not a slogan reserved for diplomatic speeches.
The international community must also reject a false choice between supporting Taiwan’s security and avoiding war. These objectives are not mutually exclusive. Properly designed deterrence can help prevent conflict, while sustained diplomacy can reduce the risk that defensive preparations become a cycle of escalating threats.
Taiwan must not be bullied into surrender, and China must not be allowed to mistake restraint for weakness. The world should be equally clear that no government has the right to settle a political dispute through military coercion. Peace cannot mean the enforced silence of the threatened. It must mean security without subjugation, dialogue without intimidation and coexistence without the threat of invasion.
The test is no longer whether Taiwan can express its determination to remain free. It is whether the international community has the courage to defend the principle behind that determination before a crisis becomes a catastrophe. If the world waits until force is used, its declarations of commitment to peace may come too late to matter.

